"It is the duty of the people to care for him who shall have borne the battle, his widow, and orphan."
-Abraham Lincoln

Monday, February 27, 2017

Cook: Right to a Board Hearing After Remand from the Court and an Attack on Deference

Cook v. Snyder, Case Number 15-0873, decided January 31, 2017 answers whether a veteran has the right to another Board hearing after remand of his claim from the CAVC. In a tour de force opinion by Judge Bartley, in which the Court conducts an exhaustive analysis of statutory and regulatory interpretation, the Court ultimately finds the veteran does have a right to another post-remand Board hearing.

The veteran here received a remand from the Court and asked for a hearing from the Board specifically stating he wished the opportunity to address certain points through his testimony.  The Board noted he had previously had a hearing (actually two) and denied the request and the claim. 
Before the Court, the veteran argued the denial of his request for a hearing was in error.  The case dealt with 38 USC 7107(b).  The Court determined that both the veteran and the Secretary’s interpretations of 7107(b) were grammatically plausible and thus the “statute’s language is simply not clear on this point.”  Id. at *9.  The Court noted “Because Congress has not directly addressed the precise issue at question, the next step in the Court’s analysis would be to determine whether the VA’s implementing regulation permissibly construes the statute and, if so, defer to that construction.”  Id. at *10.  The Court concludes Chevron deference is not owed in this case for two reasons.  First, no VA regulation resolves the statutory ambiguity—
Here, the regulations cited by the Secretary all contain the same basic ambiguous language that, although not phrased identically to the statute, do nothing to clarify the ambiguity … as to whether a VA claimant who has had a personal hearing before the Board on an appeal is entitled upon request to another Board hearing following a Court remand.  Therefore, the Court is under no obligation to accord deference to the Secretary’s interpretation under Chevron step two.
Id. at *10-11.  Secondly, the Court noted that the VA regulation preexisted the statute and that because Chevron deference is appropriate only where Congress has delegated authority to the agency to make rules carrying the force of law.  The Court determined the VA has not actually used that delegated authority but simply relies on a regulation predating the statute, which could not have possible been promulgated to interpret the statute.  Id. at *11.

The Court then noted where Chevron deference is inapplicable, the Court proceeds under the Skidmore rules of interpretation which look to guidance from the agency but also weigh whether such guidance is thorough, examines the reasoning, is consistent with earlier practice, and whether it is generally persuasive.  The point is that Skidmore analysis is much less deferential to the agency than Chevron.

The Court then relied heavily on the pro-veteran nature of the VA adjudicatory process as well as the fact the nature of a claim may change through the process to determine barring a post-remand personal hearing “would be neither solicitous of a claimant not productive of informed Board decisionmaking.”  The Court also pulled out the Brown v. Gardner trump card, which states any doubt in the interpretation of a VA statutes or regulations must be resolved in favor of a veteran.
Finally, the Court noted the Board was concerned the need for more hearings would inundate an already overwhelmed Board, but noted “these concerns do not authorize the Court to ignore the intent of Congress … and the solicitous and pro-claimant principles informing veterans benefits law.”  Id. at *19.

I would expect the VA to follow this opinion by seeking to change the regulations to prevent the right to a post-remand hearing.  Frankly this decision is important for at least temporarily protecting the right to a post-remand hearing, but more importantly for furthering a deep analysis to statutory and regulatory interpretation to VA law.  For too long, the VA has gotten by relying on Chevron deference, but this decision shows the veteran’s bar has become more forceful in arguing against Chevron deference and the Court is responding.


Decision by Judge Bartley, joined by Judge Pietsch and Senior Judge Hagel.