"It is the duty of the people to care for him who shall have borne the battle, his widow, and orphan."
-Abraham Lincoln

Tuesday, March 18, 2025

Ley and the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel

Ley v. McDonough, Case Number 23-1547, decided January 2, 2025 concerns whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel or constitutional principles can lead to an earlier effective date than that provided by 38 USC 5110.

The veteran was granted service connection for chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL) and given an effective date based on the veteran’s application for benefits with a 1 year look back pursuant to 38 CFR 3.114, which led to an effective date of January 29, 2015.

The Court then summarized the veteran’s position as: “Appellant does not contest the Board's analysis of the effective date to which he is entitled under section 5110. Instead, appellant raises two nonstatutory bases on which he maintains he is entitled to an effective date before January 29, 2015, for the award of service connection for CLL. One of appellant's arguments is that VA is equitably estopped from enforcing section 5110's effective date limits because the Agency's actions, in particular the alleged withholding of information from him about CLL, prevented him from filing a claim any earlier than he did. Appellant's other argument is that section 5110's effective date limitations are unconstitutional as applied to his situation because VA actively interfered with his right of access to the benefits system when Agency medical personnel failed to properly inform him of a CLL diagnosis before January 2016.”  Id. at *2.

The Court then determined: “Neither of appellant's contentions are persuasive. First, appellant's equitable estoppel argument is directly foreclosed under Taylor, in which a majority of the en banc Federal Circuit unambiguously held that "equitable estoppel is not available to override the claim-filing effectivedate limits of [section] 5110." Even if we agreed with appellant as a general matter about equitable estoppel, we are bound by the Federal Circuit's majority opinion in Taylor. Second, as we explain below, Taylor does not establish a binding rule about as-applied constitutional challenges under section 5110. However, we independently reach the same conclusion as the Taylor plurality did—that section 5110 is potentially subject to an as-applied constitutional challenge. Nevertheless, appellant can't prevail because his right-of-access claim falls well short of the kind of extraordinarily rare circumstance that could justify a court ordering the assignment of an effective date outside the parameters Congress set forth in section 5110. Because both of appellant's grounds for circumventing section 5110 are unsuccessful, and he has abandoned any other grounds for challenging the Board decision on appeal, we will affirm the Board's December 8, 2022, decision finding that appellant is not entitled to an effective date before January 29, 2015, for service connection for CLL.”  Id. at *2-3.

Judge Jaquith wrote a powerful dissent in which he agreed with the Court’s analysis of Taylor and 38 USC 5110, but determined “I disagree with the majority's conclusion that section 5110 is not unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Ley, so I respectfully dissent. In my view, a VA doctor's decision to deceive a patient about the nature and extent of his disability is (and should be) the kind of extraordinarily rare circumstance that justifies ordering the assignment of an effective date outside the parameters of section 5110.”  Id. at *22-23.

Judge Jaquith wrote: “ The majority embraces the Board's characterization of the veteran's allegation of the doctor's conduct as a "misdiagnosis" and acknowledges that the veteran also argued that the doctor deliberately withheld information and failed to properly inform him; but the majority asserts that its analysis and conclusion are the same under each formulation.157 In my view, if the hematologist "knew appellant should be diagnosed with CLL and chose not to convey that diagnosis to him,"158 that hematologist—a VA doctor—foreclosed VA's use of section 5110 as a sword to cut off, from the effective date for his claim, the years until the veteran was told the truth (by a forthcoming VA doctor) about the serious nature of his disability.”  Id. at *23.

This is an odd case built on exceptional facts.  Still, I hope it is appealed to the Federal Circuit and they find the extraordinarily rare circumstances they discussed in Taylor, includes what happened here.

Decision by Chief Judge Allen and joined by Judge Falvey, dissent by the Judge Jaquith.

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Sellers and the Presumption of Regularity

Sellers v. McDonough, Case Number 23-4114, decided December 20, 2024 involves whether a notice of appeal filed in July 2023 from a June 1996 Board decision was untimely. 

The VA filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely.  The veteran noted he had not received the notice of the June 1996 Board decision until July 2023 when his current counsel reviewed the record.

The question was whether the VA had fulfilled its notice obligations, specifically the duty to notify the veteran of the Board decision when it had actual knowledge the address the Board used was not his current address even though it was the address on file with the VA at the time. 

The Court held: “Our decision today is a narrow one. As we will explain in more detail below, we assume that Davis controls the situation we face and, that under Davis, VA only has an obligation to search for additional and plausible addresses that existed at the time of the Board's decision. So for the purposes of this decision, we assume–without deciding–that the Board satisfied its notice obligations under Davis at the time it mailed its June 1996 decision because there were no other plausible addresses in the file beyond the address the Board used to mail the decision to appellant. That does not end the matter, however, because we also conclude that under the unique facts of this case, the Board bound itself to greater notice obligations than Davis required. Specifically, the Board directed VA to continue to search for addresses that would afford appellant actual notice of the June 1996 decision. And because VA failed to satisfy those greater notice obligations, the presumption of regularity does not resolve the question about whether this appeal is timely. Instead, the relevant legal principle is that an agency may elect to provide a claimant more process than the law requires. The Board did so in 1996, and VA did not comply with those additional procedural protections. So on that narrow basis, we will deny the Secretary's motion to dismiss appellant's appeal.”  Id. at *2.

The case offers a good summary of the presumption of regularity and VA’s notice obligations. 

Order by Chief Judge Allen as well as Judges Pietsch and Bartley. 

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