"It is the duty of the people to care for him who shall have borne the battle, his widow, and orphan."
-Abraham Lincoln

Wednesday, July 7, 2021

Swanagan and Turman (Attorney Fees for Out of Country Attorneys)

Swanagan and Turman v. McDonough, Opinion Number 19-1350(E) and 19-3258(E), was decided June 23, 2021 and involves the appropriate hourly fee for attorney work under the Equal Access for Justice Act.

Veterans know that for successful work done before the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims or Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, their attorney can be paid by the government under the EAJA (Equal Access for Justice Act) statute and this amount is not paid by the veteran.  The EAJA hourly rate changes every year based on the cost of living and also factors in where the work was performed (i.e., the South, North, etc).

These cases involve an attorney that had won a case and sought EAJA fees.  The veteran had moved to Ecuador and done a portion of the work in Ecuador and the result was wrangling over the appropriate amount of the EAJA fee.   The veteran’s attorney sought a locality increase similar to the DoD and UN’s indices for cost of living in Ecuador, which would have led to a rate of approximately $196 per hour.

The Court determined:

nothing in the EAJA statute or this Court's jurisprudence bars consideration of a COL increase to the statutory maximum for attorney work performed outside the United States. However, as with any attorney fee request, appellants bear the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of their proposed method for calculating the appropriate hourly rate for work.

Id. at *10.  The Court then explained the appellant did not identify what other potential indices were available or explain why the selected the DoD and UN indices over others, no evidence the comparison U.S. cities were adequately representative, or why an average of the UN and DoD indices was appropriate.  Id. at *12.  It determined the appellant had not carried his burden and then cut his rate to $125 per hour.

EAJA cases really only concern attorneys (though they should be of consideration of veterans who want to make sure they can obtain good attorneys), but I have to admit this case really does not grab even my attention.  I frankly just don’t see too many out of country attorneys practicing veteran’s law.

Decision by Chief Judge Bartley and joined in by Judge Allen and Falvey.

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Tuesday, July 6, 2021

Andrews: How to Gain Service Connection for Hepatitis C and the Benefit of the Doubt

Andrews v. McDonough, Opinion Number 19-0352, was decided June 22, 2021 and involves what triggers the benefit of the doubt.

This is a Hepatitis C case where the veteran sought service connection and argued to the Court reversal is the proper remedy because the evidence of record met the benefit of the doubt standard and the Secretary argued reversal would require the Court to act as a fact finder in the first instance and instead urged a remand.  Ultimately, the Court did reverse but on narrow grounds.  Id. at *1-2.

The veteran said his Hepatitis C came from various in-service risk factors including: air gun immunization, dental work and a STD.  In 2010 a VA examiner said air guns were not a risk factor as to Hepatitis C and this resulted in a denial.  This ultimately led to a Board remand that ordered a new examination to discuss sexual activity.  This led to a new negative examination which discussed dental work, STD, and air gun injections and ultimately a denial of service connection.  Id. at *3. 

The Court began by acknowledging: “while the Court's authority to reverse Board findings is firmly established, it's not entirely clear what this means in practice.”  Id. at *4.  However, “it has proven difficult to identify absolute markers as to when reversal is the appropriate remedy rather than remand for further development or adjudication.”  Id. at *5.

The Court noted existing case law  “makes clear that reversal is appropriate provided that it doesn't require the Court to exceed its scope of review by engaging in improper fact finding. On a practical level, however, the line often proves blurry between judicial review—that is, reviewing, under the clearly erroneous standard, discrete findings of the Board in light of the entire factual record—and first-instance fact finding.”  Id. at *7. 

The Court explained the difficulty is that 1) “evidentiary rulings are not zero-sum affairs but often involve a complex interplay between several different factors”, 2) the Court’s “ability to evaluate evidence can be complicated when there isn't a statute or regulation spelling out precise criteria or relevant factors that bear on a given question. Often the relevant adjudicatory standard is set out in an agency manual such as the M21-1, whose provisions are mandatory for adjudicators at VA regional offices, but whose relationship with the Board and this Court is less than straightforward.” Id. at *8.

The Court then noted the Board had incorporated the M21-1 into its prior remand of the claim and stated it recognized various risk factors for hepatitis C and instructs to resolve reasonable doubt in favor of the veteran.  Id. at *9-10.  The Court noted it could not independently turn to the M21-1 to inform its decision, but could int his case because the Board’s remand order adopted its guidance.  Id. at *10.  It effectively noted that once the Board relied on the M21-1 for a remand, the veteran had an interest in the M21-1 due to his reliance on it to develop his case (even if the reliance is more fiction than fact).  

The Court then stated:

As for in-service risk factors, the Board did not dispute their occurrence; it merely discounted the likelihood that the veteran's hepatitis C originated from some of them. But the medical evidence the Board relied on to do so has been conceded as inadequate, since the opinions either failed to understand the theory of service connection at issue or rejected—contrary to VA policy—the possibility that certain risk factors could lead to hepatitis C. Put simply, no matter how diminished the Board thought the likelihood that Mr. Andrews's in-service risk factors caused his hepatitis C, this must be weighed against the absence of extra-service risk factors.

 

At the very least, in this case "the evidence favoring risk factor(s) in service is equal to the evidence favoring risk factor(s) before or after service," requiring resolution of reasonable doubt in the veteran's favor. M21-1, Pt. III, sbpt. iv, ch. 4, sec. H.2.e. Reasonable doubt exists when there is "an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence which does not satisfactorily prove or disprove the claim. It is a substantial doubt and one within the range of probability as distinguished from pure speculation or remote possibility." 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2020). To the extent that the Board found the risk factor evidence in favor of the claim didn't meet this standard, this finding was clearly erroneous. Nor, based on this record, can we see any point in remanding for additional development on the question of nexus.

Id. at *11.

The Court then granted service connection and explained:

VA obtained two medical examinations and the veteran submitted numerous private treatment records and lay statements. Yet despite all this development, VA has not suggested, much less identified, the existence of preor postservice risk factors necessary to deny service connection under the standard outlined in the M21-1. Even if another examiner once more discredits the notion that Mr. Andrews's in-service risk factors led to his hepatitis C, that still puts the likelihood of an in-service etiology at least on par with the likelihood of an extra-service etiology. In short, it's not clear what remedial value would lie in requiring VA to obtain a new examination, since that examiner would have no warrant to reject the fact that no non-service risk factors exist. Regardless of the relative probative value of the evidence supporting Mr. Andrews in-service risk factors, this much is clear: it at least matches the zero evidence suggestive of pre- or postservice risk factors. Which brings us to the final point: Whatever the quality of the evidence surrounding the risk factors, it's at least sufficient to allow VA to discern whether service connection is warranted. It's been nine years since VA began assisting Mr. Andrews to develop his case. Despite formally recognizing the M21-1 risk factors, the Board relied on a medical examination that was not only inadequate for failing to address the in-service risk factors but failed to identify any viable nonservice-related etiology for the veteran's condition. Based on the circumstances of this case—the adoption of the M21-1 standard, the conceded presence of in-service risk factors, the absence of any non-service risk factors, and the lack of any reasonable basis to believe that additional development could alter the approximate balance of evidence—the Court reverses and orders VA to award service connection to Mr. Andrews for hepatitis C.

This case is a primer on how to win an Hepatitis C case, but also is interesting in how the court really resisted reversal and only did so after saying the VA had relied on the helpful M21-1 and thus the helpful language from the M21-1 could be imported into is decision.  While the case will be helpful in all Hepatitis C cases, it seems to do little (and perhaps even harm) in the larger battle to get the Court to grant more cases themselves.

Decision by Judge Toth and joined in by Judge Allen and Falvey.

To know more about whether Thomas Andrews can help you, please visit my website.

Friday, July 2, 2021

Taylor: Human Experiments, Secrecy Oaths and Equitable Estoppel Applied by the CAFC

Taylor v. McDonough, Case Number 2019-2211, decided June 30, 2021 discusses a set of tragic effects and finds equitable estoppel applied to result in an earlier effective date. 

The veteran had been the subject of chemical agent exposure studies at the Edgewood Arsenal during the Vietnam era.  He had specifically signed an oath of secrecy related to those tests and ultimately suffered severe psychological harm as a result of the testing.

“In 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) declassified the names of the servicemen and women who had volunteered for the Edgewood Program and, in June of that year, VA sent the appellant a letter advising him that DOD had given permission for those identified to disclose to health care providers information about their involvement in the Edgewood Program that affected their health.”  Id. at *2.  In fact, the DOD had recommended telling participants of likely health consequences in 1979.

The veteran applied for benefits in February 2007 related to PTSD and submitted stressor statements related to the testing and additional stressors occurring in Vietnam.  A VA examiner determined there was PTSD resulting from “cumulative response” to the Edgewood experiments and Vietnam experiences.  The veteran was ultimately service connected for PTSD and granted TDIU with an effective date of his application date.

This appeal concerned whether an effective date prior to his application should be granted.  Section 5110 says the effective date of an award is the date of facts or found, but not earlier than the date of the receipt of application for benefits.  Mr. Taylor had signed a secrecy oath stating he would not disclose the testing and he did not apply for benefits until the DoD and VA sent a letter to veterans of the experiments that they could apply for benefits based on those experiments.  The veteran agreed normally an earlier effective date would not be allowed, but argued under the unusual facts of this case—i.e., the secrecy oath related to the testing—that an earlier effective date should be granted. 

The Veterans Court upheld the effective date finding their ability to grant equitable relief was so limited as to prevent is application under these facts. Judge Greenberg wrote a masterful dissent.

The Federal Circuit determined the Court erred in finding equitable estoppel was unavailable.  The Federal Circuit explained: “the Veterans Court may exercise such equitable powers, within the scope of its statutory jurisdiction, to ensure that “all veterans entitled to benefits receive[] them.”” Id. at *18.  The Court then explained “concluding otherwise would be contrary to the Veterans Court’s statutory mandate. Congress created the Veterans Court, through the VJRA, “for the [express] purpose of ensuring that veterans were treated fairly by the [G]overnment and to see that all veterans entitled to benefits received them[.]”  Id. at *21.

The Federal Circuit also addressed the Veterans Court’s argument that it could not use equitable estoppel to authorize payment outside of the requirements set forth in 38 U.S.C. Section 5110.  The Court explained this was error because 5110 is not jurisdiction and therefore is subject to equitable considerations.  Id. at *22.

The Court did explain that Section 5110(a)(1) does have importance and that “[i]n nearly all cases challenging the effective date of a veteran’s disability benefits, 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(1) and its enumerated exceptions will be dispositive.”  Id. at *29.  However, in this case, the Court found the government was estopped from using Section 5110(a)(1) from precluding the veteran from getting an earlier effective date because essentially the government had prevented him from making a claim by telling him he would be subject to criminal prosecution if he talked about the testing.

This is a monumental victory for the veteran and his advocates, but also based on particularly sympathetic facts, which necessarily led to the conclusion reached by the Federal Circuit.  It will be interesting to see in the years to follow how it is pushed to gain earlier effective dates.  It also serves as a repudiation of a Veterans Court decision that seemed focused on limiting its ability to review cases and grant relief rather than giving justice to those who deserve it.

Decision by Judge Wallach and joined in by Judges Newman and O’Malley.

To know more about whether Thomas Andrews can help you, please visit my website.

Monday, June 14, 2021

Snyder: 90 Days of Service Upheld in the ALS Regulation

Snyder v. McDonald, Case Number 2020-2168, decided June 9, 2020 discusses and upholds the 90 day active duty requirement for the presumption of ALS. 

The veteran served for 50 days during the Vietnam era (a period of war), he received an honorable discharge due to a knee injury.  Four decades later he sought service connection for Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS).

The Court explained that the veteran had argued to “meet the fundamental requirement of service connection, solely on an argument about a VA regulation, adopted in 2008 and made final in 2009, that provides a presumption of service connection for veterans with ALS if specified preconditions are satisfied. 38 C.F.R. § 3.318(a), (b).”  Id. at *2.  However, it noted the veteran

“undisputedly does not satisfy one of those preconditions—that the veteran “have active, continuous service of 90 days or more.” Id. § 3.318(b)(3). Nevertheless, Mr. Snyder argued in the Veterans Court that the 90-day-service precondition is unlawful, because contrary to the statutory scheme and arbitrary and capricious, and that the presumption should remain in place with the precondition nullified, entitling him to a finding of service connection.”

Id. at *2.  The Court noted the ALS presumption is entirely a regulatory creation and Congress has not spoken as to an ALS presumption.  Id. at *3.  The Court noted the underlying IOM Report which led to the VA’s ALS presumption noting and discussed the regulation.  Id. at *6.  The presumption contained three exceptions: 1) where there is affirmative evidence ALS was not incurred during or aggravated by military service, 2) there is affirmative evidence ALS was caused by the veteran’s own willful misconduct, and 3) service connection would not be presumed if the veteran did not have 90 days of active and continuous service.  Id. at *7.  The VA explained in its rulemaking: “We believe that 90 days is a reasonable period to ensure that an individual has had sufficient contact with activities in military service to encounter any hazards that may contribute to development of ALS.”  Id. at *7.

The veteran argued the VA exceeded its statutory authority and the 90 day limitation was arbitrary and capricious.  First, the Court  noted 38 U.S.C. Section 501(a) gives authority for the regulation and the 90 day requirement does not impermissibly redefine the term “veteran.”  As to the arbitrary and capricious argument, the Court deferred to the agency because the action was reasonable and reasonably explained.  Id. at *12.  The Court determined:

“In these circumstances, neither the evidence nor logic required the Secretary to limit his options to either ignoring length of service altogether or declining to adopt a presumption at all. The Secretary could reasonably choose a familiar short period to avoid what he reasonably found would be too demanding an evidentiary standard (no presumption) or too lenient a standard (no minimum service period) for applying the statutory requirement of service connection to veterans with ALS. We conclude that the Secretary “reasonably considered the relevant issues and reasonably explained the decision” and made a choice within the “zone of reasonableness.””

Id. at *16.

Decision by Judge Taranto and joined in by Judges Linn and Chen.

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Langdon: Federal Circuit on Lumbar and Thoracic Spine Conditions Being Treated Together

Langdon v. McDonald, Case Number 2020-1789, decided June 9, 2020 discusses the intersection of lumbar and thoracic spine conditions and how they are interrelated and as such should be rated. 

The VA had determined the veteran had a service connected thoracic spine injury and a non-service connected lumbar spine injury with only 55 degrees of forward flexion for his thoracolumbar spine, but that his service connected thoracic spine condition did not cause any functional impairment.  Essentially, the VA argued the limitation in range of motion was related to the veteran’s non-service connected lumbar injury.  As a result, the veteran only had a 0% rating.  He sought a 20% rating under Diagnostic Code 5237. 

The Court framed the appeals as:

require[ing] us to determine if the VA’s own regulation requires it to treat the thoracolumbar spine as a unit when applying the General Rating Formula. The Veterans Court held the General Rating Formula “calls for the thoracic and lumbar spine generally to be rated as a unit. But it does not mandate that they be rated together.” J.A. 8 (emphasis in original). It interpreted the General Rating Formula to “provide[] for such unitary treatment only when both segments of the spine are injured as a result of military service . . . or when it is not possible to separate the functional limitations of an injury and assign them to each part of the spine and one part is service connected.” J.A. 8–9. We reject that interpretation and hold the plain language of the regulation requires that the VA treat the thoracolumbar spine as a unit when applying the General Rating Formula.

 

By its terms, the General Rating Formula does not allow the VA to distinguish between the thoracic and lumbar spine segments. It uses the phrase “thoracolumbar spine,” not the words thoracic or lumbar. Not once does the General Rating Formula separate out the segments of the thoracolumbar spine. Likewise, the Notes accompanying the General Rating Formula repeatedly use the word thoracolumbar, but do not refer to the thoracic and lumbar spine segments separately. Additionally, the diagrams in Plate V depict thoracolumbar flexion as the movement of the entire thoracolumbar spine. The plain language of the General Rating Formula, thus, treats the thoracic and lumbar spine segments as a unit. We cannot rewrite that text to include criteria absent from its face.

Id. at *6-7.

The Court also rejected the argument that this interpretation would allow for compensation for non-service connected disabilities, explaining:

we agree with Mr. Langdon that this argument rests on the incorrect premise that he lacks the injury for which he will receive compensation—a service-connected thoracolumbar spine injury. For the General Rating Formula to apply, a veteran must first show that he has a service-connected disability. Cf. Grantham v. Brown, 114 F.3d 1156, 1158–59 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting service-connectedness is “logically up-stream” from compensation level). Only then does the General Rating Formula set the veteran’s rating level for that service-connected injury. The VA made the choice in its regulation to treat the thoracolumbar spine as a unit for rating purposes “[b]ecause the thoracic and lumbar segments ordinarily move as a unit,” making it “clinically difficult to separate the range of movement of one from that of the other.” Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 56,512. The VA is entitled to make such a choice to aid in properly assessing and rating injuries.

Id. at *9.

This is a fairly narrow case, but one that is instructive on how the VA often attempts to the add to its own regulations language that would limit benefits, without actually going through the process of actually amending the regulations.

Decision by Chief Judge Moore joined in by Judges Prost and Chen.

To know more about whether Thomas Andrews can help you, please visit my website.

Anania: Mailbox Rule Helps Veteran

Anania v. McDonough, Opinion Number 2020-1086, was decided June 10, 2021 by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and involves the intersection of statements by a veteran’s counsel and the mailbox rule.

This case involved whether a Form 9 was filed to continue an appeal.  The Form 9 must be filed within 60 days of the VA issuing a SOC.  The Veterans Court had “relied on a bright-line rule holding “a party’s own self-serving testimony” per se insufficient to establish the presumption of receipt under the common law mailbox rule.” Id. at *2.  However, the Federal Circuit determined “a party’s affidavit may provide credible evidence to satisfy the mailbox rule, and because the Government does not challenge the credibility of the party’s affidavit in this case, we reverse.” Id. at *2.

The Court explained:

“Under the common law mailbox rule, ‘if a letter properly directed is proved to have been either put into the post office or delivered to the postman, it is presumed, from the known course of business in the post office department, that it reached its destination at the regular time, and was received by the person to whom it was addressed.’” Rios v. Nicholson (Rios I), 490 F.3d 928, 930–31 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 193 (1884)). This presumption “is not a conclusive presumption of law, but a mere inference of fact, founded on the probability that the officers of the government will do their duty and the usual course of business.” Rosenthal, 111 U.S. at 193 (quoting Huntley v. Whittier, 105 Mass. 391, 392 (1870)). If evidence is presented that the letters were never received, the evidence “must be weighed with all the other circumstances of the case, by the [trier of fact] in determining the question whether the letters were actually received or not.”

Id. at *5.

The Federal Circuit then:

“Reject[ed] the Veterans Court’s rule that self-serving affidavits are per se insufficient to establish the presumption under the mailbox rule.  Indeed, it seems particularly inappropriate to apply an artificially rigid approach to the assessment of evidence on the factual question of mailing in the area of veterans’ benefits law given the absence of a statute commanding such a rule and the pro-claimant, nonadversarial nature of the statutory scheme created by Congress.”

Id. at *12.  The Court then stated:  “We note that the Government never challenged the credibility of the substance of Mr. Carpenter’s statement. Namely, the Government does not assert that the appeal Mr. Carpenter mailed was not properly addressed, stamped, and mailed in adequate time to reach its destination.”  Id. at *14.

This is an interesting case that uses the mailbox rule (usually applied to help the VA) to help a veteran.

Decision by Judge Stoll and joined in by Judges Dyk and Taranto.

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Friday, June 11, 2021

Lynch (Evidence in Equipose Examined by the Federal Circuit)

Lynch v. McDonough, Opinion Number 2020-2067, was decided June 3, 2021 by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and involves the benefit of the doubt rule and its application.

The benefit of the doubt is found in 38 USC 5107 and states:

The Secretary shall consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a case before the Secretary with respect to benefits under laws administered by the Secretary. When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.

38 CFR Section 3.102 further explains:

When, after careful consideration of all procurable and assembled data, a reasonable doubt arises regarding service origin, the degree of disability, or any other point, such doubt will be resolved in favor of the claimant. By reasonable doubt is meant one which exists because of an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence which does not satisfactorily prove or disprove the claim.

The Veterans Court had found “the doctrine of reasonable doubt . . . d[oes] not apply here because the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim.”  The Veterans Court relied on Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001), which “held that “the benefit of the doubt rule is inapplicable when the preponderance of the evidence is found to be against the claimant.”  Id. at *5.

The veteran argued Ortiz was wrongly decided because it requires an equipoise of the evidence standard to trigger the benefit of the doubt and that the Court had read out the modifier “approximate” in the “approximate balance” standard.  Id. at *6.  The Court stated the veteran misread Ortiz and that

“Ortiz necessarily requires that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule may be triggered in situations other than equipoise of the evidence—specifically, situations where the evidence is “nearly equal,”1 i.e., an “approximate balance” of the positive and negative evidence as set forth in § 5107(b) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.102.” 

Id. at *7.  Instead, the Court explicitly stated:

So, let us be clear. Under § 5107(b) and Ortiz, a claimant is to receive the benefit of the doubt when there is an “approximate balance” of positive and negative evidence, which Ortiz interpreted as “nearly equal” evidence. This interpretation necessarily includes scenarios where the evidence is not in equipoise but nevertheless is in approximate balance. Put differently, if the positive and negative evidence is in approximate balance (which includes but is not limited to equipoise), the claimant receives the benefit of the doubt.

Id. at *8.

Judge Dyk wrote a concurrence and dissent stating that Ortiz’s preponderance of the evidence standard is inconsistent with 38 U.S.C. 5107.  He explained:

Because preponderant evidence may be found when the evidence tips only slightly against a veteran’s claim, that standard is inconsistent with the statute’s standard that the veteran wins when there is an “approximate balance” of evidence for and against a veteran’s claim. “Approximate” is not the same as “slight.” By reframing the statute’s standard in terms of preponderance of the evidence, Ortiz departed from the clear language of the statute to the disadvantage of the veteran. It is not difficult to imagine a range of cases in which the evidence is in approximate balance between the veteran and the government (and the veteran should recover), but still slightly favors the government (and under the majority’s test, the veteran would not recover).

 

Ortiz’s holding effectively and impermissibly restricts the benefit-of-the-doubt rule to cases in which there is close to an evidentiary tie, a proposition that the majority agrees would be contrary to the “approximate balance” language of the statute. See Maj. Op. 8. Indeed, the government appeared to agree at oral argument that when the evidence against a veteran’s claim is equal to “equipoise plus a mere peppercorn,” denying the benefit-of-the-doubt rule would be contrary to statute.

Id. at *12-13.

This is an interesting case in that it attempts explain the term approximate balance, but I think Judge Dyk is correct.  The attempt to explain only further muddies the definition.  However, I am not sure how much impact it will have as a good attorney will try to develop your case with lay and expert evidence that surpasses an approximate balance.

Decision by Judge Prost and joined in by Judge Clevenger.  Dissent by Judge Dyk.

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