"It is the duty of the people to care for him who shall have borne the battle, his widow, and orphan."
-Abraham Lincoln

Friday, June 7, 2024

Ferko: An Untimely NOD and 38 CFR 3.109(b)

Ferko v. McDonough, Case Number 21-3467, decided May 28, 2024 concerns whether a NOD was timely.

Typically a NOD must be submitted within one year from the date of mailing of notice of the decision.  The veteran missed the date by 2 weeks after he had had emergency open heart surgery.  At the time he requested an extension based on good cause citing his surgery.

The VA determined the NOD was untimely but never addressed the extension request.  It then found it did not have jurisdiction.

The Court determined:

“The one-year deadline in section 7105(b) to file an NOD in the legacy system is not a jurisdictional bar to Board review. It is an important and mandatory claim-processing rule, but it does not deprive the Board of the authority to consider the merits of an appeal simply because the NOD is received late. As a nonjurisdictional claim processing rule, section 7105(b)'s one-year period is amenable to an appropriate exception. Indeed, this is exactly what a current VA regulation allows, as our caselaw has long held that 38 C.F.R. § 3.109(b) applies to NODs. That regulation permits extensions to VA's internal deadlines for good cause. It is under this governing regulatory standard that the Board should have considered and adjudicated Mr. Ferko's extension request. But despite the lengthy passage of time, VA has still not issued a decision evincing a proper understanding of § 3.109(b)'s role in permitting it to accept the veteran's untimely NOD.”

Id. at *2. 

Critically, the Court found 38 CFR Section 3.109(b) applies to NODs and states:

“Extension of time limit. Time limits within which claimants or beneficiaries are required to act to perfect a claim or challenge an adverse VA decision may be extended for good cause shown. Where an extension is requested after expiration of a time limit, the action required of the claimant or beneficiary must be taken concurrent with or prior to the filing of a request for extension of the time limit, and good cause must be shown as to why the required action could not have been taken during the original time period and could not have been taken sooner than it was. Denials of time limit extensions are separately appealable issues.”

Thus, the Court sidestepped the issue of equitable tolling and simply relied on Section 3.109.

A concurrence also wrote: “The evidence makes a viable case for reversal: Mr. Ferko submitted treatment notes attesting to his open-heart surgery and convalescence that seem sufficient to excuse a 12-day delay in filing his NOD.  Let's face it, if open-heart surgery is not good cause, it's hard to imagine what is. That said, the Board looked at the case through the lens of equitable tolling. R. at 9. It did not grapple with this question as it is framed by the requirements of the regulation. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.109(b) (requiring the claimant to show good cause "as to why the required action could not have been taken during the original time period and could not have been taken sooner than it was"). Stinson and Tadlock counsel that it would be impermissible factfinding for this Court to conclude that Mr. Ferko met the good cause requirement of § 3.109(b). Therefore, mindful of limiting precedent, this case returns to the Board for it to consider the matter of good cause under § 3.109(b).”  Id. at *11.

Another concurrence wrote that it would have decided the case on the basis of equitable tolling because the veteran specifically disclaimed the statutory argument and instead sought to rely on equitable tolling.

This was a full panel decision with the opinion by Judge Toth and several concurring opinions. 

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Friday, May 31, 2024

Frazier: Substituted Parties and Limitations on What Can be Received

Frazier v. McDonough, Case Number 22-4670, decided May 23, 2024 is a decision by the Veterans Court discussing substitution of an adult child related to the veteran’s claims for specially adapted housing (SAH) or special home adaption grant (SHA) and automobile adaptive benefits.

The adult child was substituted into the claim after the veteran died, but the Board dismissed the appeals concerning claims for SAH, SHA and automobile benefits because a claimant is eligible for substitution only for claims for periodic monetary benefits, and not for claims for personal benefits administered through the Veterans Health Administration."  The Board concluded it lacked jurisdiction over those claims as a result of the veteran's death.  Id. at *1-2.

The adult child appealed arguing “that as a qualified accrued benefits recipient under 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a), she is permitted to be substituted to continue the appeal of the veteran's claim under 38 U.S.C. § 5121A for "any benefit," which includes any non-accrued (or non-periodic) benefits like SAH or SHA or for automobile adaptive equipment. And to the extent the regulation the Board cited, 38 C.F.R. § 3.1010(a), provides otherwise, appellant argues that it is invalid.”  Id. at *2.

The Court concluded: “under section 5121A (with our emphasis added), an eligible accrued benefits recipient may request substitution "[i]f a claimant dies while a claim for any benefit under a law administered by the Secretary, . . . is pending[.]" Congress provided no restriction on the type of benefit at issue, other than it is one the Secretary administers. Restricting substitution requests for an eligible accrued benefits recipient to only those cases involving a "claim for periodic monetary benefits," as the Secretary urges, inappropriately imposes a limitation Congress did not. Therefore, we hold that section 5121A unambiguously provides that an eligible accrued benefits recipient can be substituted in a claim for any benefit, including non-accrued benefits. But that is not without limitation. We also hold that an accrued benefits recipient under section 5121(a)(6) is limited to reimbursement for last expenses of sickness and burial and nothing more, even if substituted under section 5121A. And, to the extent the Secretary's implementing regulation, § 3.1010(a), provides otherwise, it is unlawful and we invalidate it. Because the Board clearly erred when it dismissed the veteran's claims for SAH or SHA and automobile adaptive benefits, we will reverse that portion of the Board's decision. We will then remand those matters for the Board to adjudicate the merits of the veteran's claims for SAH, SHA, and automobile adaptive benefits, with appellant as the substituted claimant.”  Id. at *1-2.

Importantly, for substituted parties, the question of what can be gained by a substituted party has been answered by the Court.  It states that “Section 5121(a)(6) allows payment of accrued benefits but "only so much of the accrued benefits may be paid as may be necessary to reimburse the person who bore the expense of last sickness and burial."75 The language plainly places a cap on the amount that an accrued benefits recipient could receive if they are only eligible on the basis of the one who "bore the expense of last sickness and burial."76 The question is whether the limitation set forth in § 5121(a)(6) applies when a person in that category is pursuing a substitution claim under section 5121A.”  Id. at *16-17.

The Court concluded this discussion of the cap by stating: “So, we read section 5121A to require that a person who is allowed to substitute on the grounds that they bore the expense of a veteran's last sickness and burial is limited by the amount of such expense when allowed to substitute into a deceased veteran's claim.”  Id. at *18.

Decision by Judge Allen and joined by Chief Judge Bartley and Judge Jaquith. 

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Smith: The CAFC Does Not Find CUE

Smith v. McDonough, Case Number 2022-2169, decided May 20, 2024 is a decision by the Federal Circuit that discusses CUE and affirms a finding by the Veterans Court that found no error in the interpretation of 38 CFR 20.1403.

The veteran developed a deep vein thrombosis (DVT) in service and discharged as no longer fit for duty.  Subsequently he applied for service connection of the DVT but was denied in a decision that said the DVT had resolved.  The decision was affirmed by the Board in 1996 and the decision was appealed.

In 2016, the veteran filed a motion to revise the 1996 Board decision arguing “there was enough evidence in front of the 1996 Board that showed extant DVT, including Physical Evaluation Board (“PEB”) reports, to have overcome the well-grounded threshold. He thus asserted that his claim should have been allowed to proceed aided by the VA’s duty to assist.”  Id. at *3.

The Board denied the motion but an appeal to the Veterans Court led to a remand to consider whether PEB reports from 1991 and 1994 were probative of a diagnosis of DVT.  On remand, the Board determined there was some evidence to support his claim and the 1996 dismissal of the claim as not well grounded was incorrect.  However, the Board held the error was not enough to support a finding of CUE.  It determined: “Given the presence of evidence on both sides of the question, the Board could not conclude “that it was absolutely clear that the Veteran did have a diagnosis of DVT.””  Id. at *4.

The Veterans Corut affirmed saying the “error did not constitute CUE because the record was not “manifestly clear that the veteran had a current disability” at the time of the 1996 Board Decision.”  Id. at *4.

The veteran argued “the Veterans Court legally erred in interpreting 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403 by limiting CUE-eligible errors to those that manifestly changed the outcome “with respect to the merits of the underlying claim” and, specifically, limiting CUE-eligible errors to those in which “but for an alleged error, service connection would have been awarded.” Veterans Court Decision.”  Id. at *4.

First, the Federal Circuit found it had jurisdiction to consider the issue as it was one of regulatory interpretation.  Id. at *6.

Then, the Federal Circuit turned to the merits.  It noted:

“Smith contends that the Veterans Court incorrectly interpreted 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403 to require that but-for the error, the veteran would have been awarded service connection. See Veterans Court Decision at *1. Smith argues that the regulation does not limit the outcomes affected by CUE to changes to the ultimate determination of service connection. He contends that a change in the course of proceedings that may change the ultimate award of service connection may suffice as a manifest change in the outcome. Smith therefore argues that allowing his claim to proceed to a merits determination after triggering the VA’s duty to assist would have met the only test set forth in the regulation.”  Id. at *7.

The Court disagreed and determined: “the “manifestly different” outcome standard of 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403 cannot be met by correcting an error that leads only to continued litigation with an uncertain result on the merits of the claim. We therefore conclude that the Veterans Court properly interpreted the regulation in affirming the 2020 Board’s Decision.”  Id. at *8.  The Court pointed to Bustos v. West, 179 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999) as similar if not controlling. 

This case demonstrates the Court’s have interpreted the CUE standard strictly so that a winning CUE is difficult.

Decision by Judge Linn and joined by Judges Lourie and Stoll. 

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Thursday, May 30, 2024

Barry: Special Monthly Compensation Half Steps

Barry v. McDonough, Case Number 2022-1747, decided May 16, 2024 is a decision by the Federal Circuit and discusses special monthly compensation (SMC) and how it is impacted by multiple SMC increases.

Factually, the Court explained: “The Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) initially gave Mr. Barry a 100% disability rating and awarded him SMC. After receiving several subsequent rating decisions, Mr. Barry received the rating decision at issue here in December 2014. His compensated disabling conditions include the amputation of his right leg above the knee, rated at 100%, the loss of use of his left foot, the loss of use of his left leg, and a constellation of other conditions related to his legs and feet. Based on these ratings, Mr. Barry received SMC at the rate specified in 38 U.S.C. § 1114(m) and received an intermediate-rate increase in his SMC under 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3). Mr. Barry does not receive SMC, however, for his many other disabling conditions: post-traumatic stress disorder, rated at 70%; right shoulder arthritis, rated at 60%; left shoulder arthritis, rated at 50%; left eye injury with glaucoma, rated at 30%; left eye disfigurement, rated at 30%; bilateral hearing loss, rated at 20%; lumbar spine injury, rated at 10%; right hand injury, rated at 10%; left and right hip joint disease, rated at 10% each; hypertension, rated at 10%; and tinnitus, rated at 10%.”  Id. at *5.

The Court explained “Mr. Barry appealed the Board’s determination to the Veterans Court. Mr. Barry principally argued that the Board erred by not considering whether he would be entitled to an additional SMC increase under 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3). Since Mr. Barry had already received one SMC increase under § 3.350(f)(3), the Veterans Court framed the question as whether § 3.350(f)(3) entitled a veteran to only one SMC increase or whether a veteran could increase his SMC under § 3.350(f)(3) more than once.”  Id. at *6.  The majority of the Veterans Court determined a veteran could only receive one SMC increase under 3.350(f)(3). 

The Court began with the text but determined “the plain language of § 3.350(f)(3) standing alone does not conclusively resolve the issue dividing the parties.” Decision, 35 Vet. App. at 122. Having elicited all we can from the isolated text of § 3.350(f)(3), then, we turn to context.”  Id. at *11.

When the Court turned to the context, they determined: “The broader statutory and regulatory context unambiguously shows that 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3) can provide for more than one SMC increase.”  Id. at *11.

The Court dug into the surrounding statutory language and stated: “Taken together, these provisions describe an SMC program that has: (1) eligibility requirements to show entitlement to SMC or SMC increases; (2) mandatory SMC awards or increases; and (3) an SMC cap. At least for 38 U.S.C. § 1114(p), insofar as it relates to our interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3) here, Congress did not add additional limitations or requirements, nor should we. We do not add limitations to the statutory scheme that are not reflected in the text of the law Congress passed.”  Id. at *13. 

The Court concluded: “In sum, as long as Mr. Barry is entitled to an intermediate-rate SMC increase under 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3), he shall receive it, subject to the explicit cap. Thus, § 3.350(f)(3), in the context of other statutory and regulatory provisions, unambiguously allows for more than one intermediate-rate SMC increase. We decline the government’s invitation to read in new requirements that Congress and the Secretary did not create.”  Id. at *13.

Judge Lourie dissented, arguing that “38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3), when examined in the context of the regulation’s surrounding subsections and the statute that they implement, has only a single reasonable meaning: that a veteran is limited to a single half-step increase in SMC benefits, irrespective of how many additional single service-connected disabilities or combinations of service-connected disabilities the veteran may have that are independently ratable at 50 percent or higher.”  Id. at *32.

This decision is both a careful example of contextually reading a statute.  But, also important in unlocking SMC increases that were otherwise denied by the VA.

Decision by Judge Prost and joined by Judge Reyna with a dissent by Judge Lourie. 

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Wednesday, May 29, 2024

Hamilton: Constructive Possession in the Context of a Section 1151 Claim

 

Hamilton v. McDonough, case no 22-3726, decided May 23, 2024 comes just two months after the Federal Circuit’s decision in Varad v. McDonough and concerns the doctrine of constructive possession in the context of a section 1151 claim. 

The case concerned a claim for Section 1151 benefits after a Federal Tort Claim Act claim had been filed.  The veteran asked that the file from the administrative FTCA claim be associated with his Section 1151 claim.  The Board acknowledged the administrative FTCA claim and the ultimate settlement of the claim, but denied the 1151 claim and noted the veteran had not submitted any evidence in connection with the administrative FTCA claim.

The veteran argued the FTCA claim file was constructively part of the VA claims file and thus should have been discussed by the Board.  The Secretary argued the entirety of the FTCA claim file was shielded from disclosure to the veteran under the attorney work-product doctrine.

The Court concluded:

“the FTCA claim file satisfies the traditional elements for constructive possession. But the attorney work-product doctrine recognizes that at least some of the information generated by members of the legal profession on behalf of their clients in preparation for litigation is protected from disclosure, and the Privacy Act makes clear that this principle applies even when individuals are seeking Federal records related to themselves. The protections of the work-product doctrine and the Privacy Act are relevant to this case. And yet neither the doctrine nor the Privacy Act grants the Secretary a blanket absolution from disclosure of all documents within a folder labeled "FTCA claim file" based on his own say-so. What they protect from disclosure is specific information rather than classes of documents. Thus, when the Secretary invokes the work-product doctrine or the Privacy Act's related exemption to shield an FTCA claim file from disclosure, the Board must assess what information in that file is protected and what information is not protected.

Unprotected information must be associated with the VA claims file according to the duty to assist. As a rule, as explained below, facts are disclosable, opinions are not. Because the Agency never attempted—even in a manner consistent with the work-product doctrine or the Privacy Act—to associate Mr. Hamilton's FTCA claim file with his VA claims file, the Board failed to ensure that VA satisfied its duty to assist.”

Id. at *2.

This decision is a unique application of the law on constructive possession to a Section 1151 claim.  It also spells out the manner in which the Board should have determined what materials were made a part of the records.  However, it also represents a further use of the constructive possession doctrine to expand what should have been considered by the VA.

Decision by Judge Toth and joined in by Judges Greenberg and Allen. 

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McCauley: The Burden in a Severance Case

McCauley v. McDonough, Opinion Number 23-1692, was decided May 20, 2024 by the Veterans Court and concerns a proposed severance of service connection.

The veteran was granted service connection for diabetes, coronary artery disease and other associated residuals.  However, the VA subsequently found CUE in the grants and sought to sever the rating.  This case presented a unique question to the Veterans Court: “if service connection was granted on one theory that was later found to be clearly and unmistakably erroneous, must the Board address alternative theories of entitlement that are raised by the claimant or reasonably raised by the record before upholding severance of service connection? As we explain, we hold that it must. This means that the severance standards of 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d) require that the Secretary prove that service connection cannot be granted or maintained under any reasonably raised theory for severance of service connection to be proper.”  Id. at *1. 

The Court then applied this to the facts of the case and determined the Secretary did not meet his burden.  It noted the VA specifically flagged the need to address Camp Lejeune with regard to this appeal, but never did and the Board found the severance proper. 

The Court then framed the issue as: “must the Board address alternative theories of entitlement before upholding severance of service connection? In other words, what is the extent of the Secretary's burden in severance cases—must he prove only that service connection on the theory under which it was granted is erroneous, or must he also prove that service connection cannot be granted based on any theory raised by the claimant or the record?”  Id. at *4.  It also noted when service connection is severed despite the Secretary not meeting its burden, the severance is void ab initio—a legal nullity and the proper remedy is for the Court to reverse with instructions to reinstate service connection retroactive to the date of severance.  Id. at *4-5.

The Court then addressed the VA’s burden and noted

“Unlike CUE, severance is anchored in the present. As the regulation says, "service connection will be severed only where evidence establishes that it is clearly and unmistakably erroneous." 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d) (emphasis added). This means that the Secretary must prove that it is currently clearly and unmistakably erroneous for the claimant to be service connected.  This means that the Secretary's job is not done if he only shows that the theory on which service connection was originally granted was erroneous—that would not necessarily prove that maintaining service connection is clearly erroneous. To prove that service connection is currently clearly erroneous, the Secretary needs to show that service connection cannot be granted or maintained under any theory. After all, if unresolved theories could maintain service connection, the Secretary cannot show that service connection "is clearly and unmistakably erroneous." 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d).”

Id. at *5-6.

The Court noted the VA is not required to consider every conceivable alternative theory, but those raised by the veteran or the record.  Id. at *6.  In other words, “Tying this all together, we see that in considering whether severance of service connection is proper, the Board must address alternative theories of entitlement that are raised by the claimant or reasonably raised by the record. If the Board upholds a severance decision without doing so, it has failed to satisfy the severance standards of § 3.105(d). And this means that the severance is void ab initio.”  Id. at *6.

This is a case that fully explains the Secretary’s burden in a severance case.  What is most interesting is that the Secretary argued so hard for remand as opposed to reversal with instructions to reinstate service connection.  The VA seems to still not understand that an improper severance (or for that matter reduction) is a legal nullity—it is as if it hadn’t happened.  Also interesting is that Judge Falvey who is typically solicitous to the VA appeared to have reached his end point with the VA with this case.

Opinion by Judge Falvey and joined in by Judges Meredith and Jaquith.

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Monday, May 20, 2024

Stiles: No Appeal from a Board Remand

Stiles v. McDonough, Opinion Number 20-3523, was dismissed on May 15, 2024 by the Veterans Court.  The veteran sought to appeal a remand, but the appeal was dismissed.  The veteran sought reconsideration and oral argument was held, but the appeal was still dismissed.

The Secretary argued the Board did decision was not a final decision and because the veteran had not exhausted his administrative remedies the Court could not hear the appeal.  The veteran argued that prior to the Board’s decision, he submitted correspondence to the Board noting the claims for service connection for sleep apnea and vertigo remained pending and the Board was required to refer those to the AOJ for development and adjudication.  He then asserted “the Board is required to adjudicate all issues expressly raised, and the Board's refusal to acknowledge his request for referral "at best[] impliedly denied jurisdiction of these claims or at wors[t] impliedly denied the claims themselves.”  Id. at *3.

He also argued: “in his motion for reconsideration that the Board's failure to refer the claims contravenes what he characterizes as the Board's regulatory duty under 38 C.F.R. § 20.904(b) to refer unadjudicated claims to the AOJ for initial adjudication.”  Id. at *3.

He “concedes that the Board did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the vertigo and sleep apnea claims, but he asserts that the Board's failure to follow this mandatory requirement and to address the jurisdictional issue that he directly raised to the Board is an implied adverse determination as to Board jurisdiction to refer the sleep apnea and vertigo claims. MFR at 3-4. He maintains that the Board's refusal to comply with § 20.904 is a legal error over which the Court may assume jurisdiction.”  Id. at *3.

The Court dismissed the action saying: “In sum, because the November 2019 Board remand did not grant or deny the claims appealed to the Board, and it did not otherwise purport to address, explicitly or implicitly, the question of whether the appellant had unadjudicated pending claims, the Court concludes that it is not a final decision over which we may exercise jurisdiction.”  Id. at *10-11.

For a successful challenge to a remand order by the Board see the Federal Circuit’s decision in Chavez.

Opinion by Chief Judge Bartley and joined in by Judges Pietsch and Meredith.

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