"It is the duty of the people to care for him who shall have borne the battle, his widow, and orphan."
-Abraham Lincoln

Friday, June 6, 2014

Stowers: Newly Discovered SMRs might equal An Earlier Effective Date



Odis C. Stowers v. Shinseki, Opinion Number 12-2823, was decided May 16, 2014 and concerns 38 CFR Section 3.156(c) and its application to a claim for an earlier effective date for a claim that was reopened due to new service medical records that had not been first associated with the file.

The veteran was denied service connection for a back disability in a 1992 and 1993, which became final.  That decision found the SMRs appeared to be incomplete, however, the records showed no in-service complaints or treatment of the back and a VA examination found the back was normal.

The veteran sought to reopen the claim in February 2008.  He submitted a private physician letter diagnosing arthritic back conditions due to in-service injuries.  The physician letter noted service medical records showing back injuries in 1979, 1983-1984, and 1986.  The veteran also submitted a letter saying service medical records from Langley AFB hospital show an extensive history of chronic back pain and authorized the VA to obtain those records.  The claim was reopened, service connected granted, evaluated at 20%, and granted effective February 2008.  The veteran filed a notice of disagreement regarding the effective date.  The Board denied an earlier effective date.

The veteran appealed to the Court arguing the VA failed to obtain complete SMRs, that there is a reasonable possibility that obtaining those records would show the 1983-1984 and 1986 injuries, and that associating those records along with the private physician letter entitled the veteran to an earlier effective date under 38 CFR Section 3.156(c).

Generally, the effective date for a reopened claim is not based on the earliest medical evidence, but the date the application was filed with the VA.  However, Section 3.156(c) creates a large exception.  “If at any time after a claim is denied VA receives or associates with the claims file service department records that existed but had not been associated with the claims file at the time VA first decided the claim, VA will reconsider the claim.”  Id. at *5.  “If VA thereafter makes an award based on whole or in part on these newly associated service department records, the assigned effective date will be the date entitlement arose or the date VA received the previously decided claim, whichever is later.”  Id.

The VA explained in the proposed revisions to this regulation that it would fit a situation where a VA denies a claim because there is no evidence of an in-service injury and then years later the veteran reapplied and submitted new SMRs and a medical opinion.  Id. at *5 and 70 Fed. Reg. 35,388, 35,389 (June 20, 2005).  Of course, this example seems to apply directly to this case.

The Court noted the regulation, explanation of the regulation by the VA, and the VA’s duty to obtain potentially relevant and identified SMRs.  It also noted the veteran identified the missing SMRs at Langley AFB hospital as documenting chronic back problems.  “Nonetheless, the Board did not address the SMRs that Dr. Hunter relied on in forming his opinion that were not previously of record, nor did the Board explain why evidence of the existence of these SMRs is not ‘identification of further available evidence not already of record.’  Thus, the Board failed to explain why these SMRs not previously of record would not be ‘relevant’ to the issue on appeal, i.e., the appellant’s entitlement to an earlier effective date.”  The Court then found the Board decision offered inadequate reasons or bases for its determination and stated if the Board determines they are relevant to the correct effective date than it must remand the case for an attempt to obtain those records.

The Court swept away the VA argument that the SMRs are not relevant because they had already granted service connection for the back because they (1) admit the private physician statement was in part the basis for the award and (2) the VA did not address the responsibility to try to associate official service department records that existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the case.  Id. at *9 (citing 38 C.F.R. Section 3.156(c).

The value of this case is limited to a narrow set of cases, but potentially very valuable.  “[W]here VA grants service connection based, in part, on a medical nexus opinion that relies on SMRs that were not associated with the claims file at the time VA first decided the claim, and have not been associated with the claims file when VA assigns an effective date for the award of benefits, the Board is obligated to consider the VA’s duty to attempt to obtain such records and the potential applicability of Section 3.156(c).”

Thursday, June 5, 2014

Internal Culture of the VA

Below is a link to a fascinating Washington Post article on the internal culture of the VA.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2014/05/30/how-the-va-developed-its-culture-of-coverups/?wprss=rss_national&clsrd

Carter v. Shinseki: Joint Motions for Remand discussed




Harmon Carter v. Shinseki, Opinion Number 12-0218, was decided May 20, 2014 and concerns the scope of a joint motion for remand.

The veteran was denied service connection for a back disability, appealed to the Court, and the VA agreed to a remand.  The claim was subsequently denied and appealed again.  The question was whether joint motion for remand involving a veteran represented by an attorney limit the scope of the Board’s independent duty to search the record for issues reasonably raised by the record.

The problem is owed to the fact the attorney waited for the VA to send a 90 day letter, which states the VA will make a decision in 90 days.  The attorney was waiting to review the file and develop arguments and a submission until that letter was sent.  However, the VA sent it to a service organization.  Technically, the attorney received the letter when she received the claims file, but was waiting to review the file until she received the letter.

The Court found “the terms of the joint motion for remand will have a bearing on what might otherwise be reasonably raised by the record.  The Board’s duty to consider issues reasonably raised by the record must be viewed in light of the terms and scope of the joint motion and the fact that the attorneys are presumed to know their case and to tailor their pleadings based on the facts and law.”  Id. at *10-*11.

The Court then determined “when an attorney agrees to a joint motion for remand based on specific issues and raises no additional issues on remand, the Board is required to focus on the arguments specifically advanced by the attorney in the motion.”  Id. at *11.

Fortunately, the joint motion for remand had broad language saying “the Board shall fully assist the veteran with his claim by reexamining the evidence of record and seeking any other evidence that is necessary to support its decision.”  Id. at *12.

The take away from the case might be to demand the broader language quoted by the Board and, for attorneys, not to rely on the 90 day letter from the VA. Importantly, it does not appear that this case will actually limit additional arguments to the Board made by a veteran or an attorney for the veteran, but will require that they are actually made.

Thursday, November 21, 2013

Floore: Individual Unemployability Examined



Jimmy H. Floore v. Eric K. Shinseki, Opinion Number 12-2017, decided November 5, 2013 concerns the issue of individual unemployability or TDIU.
The veteran had a 90% rating for various ailments including diabetes, coronary artery disease, PTSD and peripheral neuropathy of the upper and lower extremities.  He sought TDIU but was denied by the Board.  The appealed to the Court and argued (1) the Board did not provide adequate reasons and bases for its determination that a combined effects medical examination was not required for his claim and (2) the Board provided inadequate analysis as to why it determined his service connected disabilities did not prevent him from working.
The Court rejected the first argument (that the Board should have directed a C&P examination of the combined effects of his multiple disabilities) and noted the veteran did not argue how the medical reports of record were inadequate.
However, the Court granted the reversed and remanded on the second ground.  The Court noted “the Board addressed the effects of Mr. Floore’s disabilities individually, but never explained what the cumulative functional impairment of all his service-connected disabilities might be and why they do not prevent substantial gainful employment.”  Id. at *8.  The Board also neglected to mention the effects of the veteran’s diabetes.  Id. at  *9.
The Court also noted the Board failed to address potentially favorable evidence, specifically identifying a VA examination addressing the veteran’s heart condition and saying it had a severe effect on exercise and the ability to engage in sports “which potentially can indicate some adverse occupational effects”.  Id. at *8.
“Finally, it appears as though the Board was influenced in its decision by the fact that Mr. Floore terminated his employment as a result of non-service-connected disabilities.  While the basis for Mr. Floore’s terminating his employment in the trucking industry is supported by the record, it is not clear how this was weighed by the Board and to what extent it is even relevant to its determination that Mr. Floore’s service-connected disabilities do not prevent him from undertaking any substantial gainful employment.”  Id. at *9.
Judge Bartley wrote a concurrence which took the VA to task for not ordering an examination to address the combined effects of the total disabilities calling the “failure to be absolutely diligent in assisting claimants is shortsighted behavior on VA’s part.”  Id. at *11.
This is a helpful case that shows the Court will dig into the facts of a TDIU claim.  It suggests a blueprint for demanding a combined effects examination.  It also is helpful in saying the decision to quit a job for another reason is potentially not relevant to the question of the service-connected disabilities’ impact on employment.  It also suggests an argument on appeal for many cases, that the medical examinations provided was so old as to have become stale.
Decided by Chief Judge Kasold and Judges Bartley and Greene.

Wednesday, November 20, 2013

Gill: Hypertension and Deference to VA Interpretation of a Regulation



Franklin Gill v. Eric K. Shinseki, Opinion Number 12-3428, decided October 28, 2013 concerns interpretation of a VA regulation governing the rating for hypertension.

The veteran was service connected for hypertension by the Board and the Board remanded for an “appropriate” examination and rating.  The VA conducted a C&P examination which took his blood pressure 3 times and the VARO granted him 10%.

The veteran appealed arguing the VA should have taken two blood pressure measurements on different days in order to determine what rating was appropriate, rather than three on the same day.  The Board rejected this argument and noted the veteran had numerous blood pressure readings throughout the rating period and none of them warranted a higher rating.

The veteran appealed to the Court arguing DC 7101 Note (1) requires two or readings before a rating can be assigned.  The Secretary argued the plain language of Note (1) applies only to the initial confirmation of the diagnosis of hypertension, not the assignment of a rating.

The Court noted it will defer to the Secretary’s interpretation if a regulation is unclear from its language as long as that interpretation is not inconsistent with the language of the regulation or plainly erroneous.  The Court found the Secretary’s interpretation was consistent with an explanation at the time of Note (1)’s modification and reflected “his considered judgment as to the need for a specified number of blood pressure readings over multiple days to confirm hypertension.  Id. at *7.

The Court also considered if the medical examination substantially complied with the earlier remand order.  The Court noted the Board decision did not rely only on the three ratings from the C&P examination but also numerous readings over multiple years, none of which supported a higher rating.

Decided by Chief Judge Kasold and Judges Davis and Pietsch.