"It is the duty of the people to care for him who shall have borne the battle, his widow, and orphan."
-Abraham Lincoln

Friday, June 4, 2021

Van Dermark: Out of Country ER Tratement Reimbursement, Statutory Interpretation and the Use of Legislative History

Van Dermark v. McDonough, Opinion Number 19-2792, was decided June 1, 2021 and involves VA reimbursement for out of country emergency care.

The case concerned the interactions of 38 USC 1724, 1725, and 1728.  Section 1724 states “the Secretary shall not furnish hospital or domiciliary care or medical services outside any State.”  But, it creates exceptions for service connected disabilities or rehabilitations programs, gives discretion for non-citizen veterans in the Philippines and Canada for care and service for service connected disabilities, and creates an exception for outpatient clinics in the Philipines that are under the jurisdiction of the VA.  This statute was implemented through the Foreign Medical Program (FMP).

Section 1728 orders reimbursement for emergency treatment outside of the VA for service connected disabilities, a non-service connected disabilities associated with or aggravated by a service connected disability, any disability if the veteran has a permanent total disability, and any illness or injury required to continue a rehabilitation program.

Section 1725 discusses further emergency treatment reimbursement.

The veteran in this case lives in Thailand and has a schedular rating of 90% for issues not involving his heart, but has been granted TDIU.  To simply a complicated medical history, he had treatment for a cardiac event in Thailand and sought reimbursement under the FMP. 

On appeal, the veteran focused on the differences between the words furnish and reimburse in the statutes.  He contended furnish requires direct provision of healthcare whereas reimburse means payment of healthcare provided by another.  Id. at *6. 

The Court looked at the meaning of “furnish” and found just because it may bear a “narrow meaning … does not support giving it the same meaning elsewhere.”  Id. at *8. The Court determined:

But Congress "need not, and frequently does not, use the same term to mean precisely the same thing in two different statutes, even when the statutes are enacted at about the same time." Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 174-75 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). And as noted above, the relevant portions of chapter 17 were not enacted at the same time but over the course of 50 years. The consistent-usage canon—which Mr. Van Dermark implicitly invokes when he consults the way "furnish" is used in VA's other healthcare statutes— "readily yields to context, especially when a statutory term is used throughout a statute and takes on distinct characters in distinct statutory provisions." Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1863 (2019) (quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1865 ("The consistent-usage canon breaks down where Congress uses the same word in a statute in multiple conflicting ways."). Because Congress has not defined "furnish" and has used it to mean distinct things throughout chapter 17, section 1724(a) itself provides the most important contextual clues to the scope of "furnish" in that provision. Several considerations persuade us that subsection (a) uses the term "furnish" in its broader sense of "provide for." Thus, the general ban on VA's furnishing medical services abroad also bars reimbursement for medical services, save for the exceptions specified in later subsections of 1724.

Id. at *9.  It then noted,

the historical evidence shows that, at the time that Congress permitted medical treatment for service-connected disabilities to be "furnished" to veterans abroad, VA had no healthcare infrastructure abroad to provide such treatment directly but would provide it as appropriate by paying for it. Thus, when Congress in 1940 affirmed the general bar on the furnishing of VA medical treatment to veterans outside the United States but permitted such treatment to be furnished for service-connected disabilities, it was using the word "furnish" in the indirect sense of the Agency arranging or paying for treatment provided by non-VA entities.

Id. at *11.

The Court summarized its ruling as stating:

the Court concludes that sections 1725 and 1728 permit reimbursement for veterans who receive emergency treatment from domestic, non-VA healthcare providers. In contrast, section 1724 covers when veterans abroad who receive medical care or services—including emergency treatment—may receive reimbursement. As relevant here, because Mr. Van Dermark was not seeking medical care in connection with a service-connected condition or as part of a rehab program, the Board properly determined that his May 2016 and May 2018 treatments at Bangkok Hospital for cardiac issues—even if qualifying as emergency treatment— could not, under section 1724, be reimbursed by VA.

Id. at *13.

Judge Greenberg dissented essentially arguing if the term was ambiguous it should have been read in favor of the veteran: “What the majority calls historical context to support a plain language finding could very easily be described as reviewing legislative history to uncover the meaning of an ambiguous term.”

This decision has limited impact in terms of its factual reach, but shows the Court’s willingness to look at legislative history.  Here, such a willingness assisted in propping up the Secretary’s interpretation narrow interpretation.  It should prod veteran advocates to make the same arguments in favor of pro-veteran interpretations.

Decision by Judge Toth and joined in by Judge Pietsch.  Dissent by the Judge Greenberg.

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Thursday, June 3, 2021

Andrews: Board Obligations on Remand Post-AMA, i.e., no additional evidence

Andrews v. McDonough, Opinion Number 19-3227, was decided May 28, 2021 and involves what happens when a case is remanded from the Court to the Board.

The parties agreed a remand was necessary for the VA to provide a new examination and for the Board to provide an adequate reason or bases for its decision.  The veteran argued he had a right to have the Court direct the Board to expedite the proceedings, provide a hearing at the Board, and submit additional evidence to the Board.  Id. at *3.  The Secretary agreed the claim must be expedited, but argued the veteran cannot submit more evidence because this option is unavailable under the direct review docket that he selected when he appealed to the Board under the AMA.  At oral argument, counsel for the veteran informed the Court he did not plan to request a hearing so the only question before the Court was whether the veteran could submit more evidence on remand and what the Board must do in response to the evidence. 

The court noted: “At its core, this is a question about how Fletcher and Kutscherousky apply within the new process Congress created through the AMA.”  Id. at *4.  The Court then stated:

Merging these holdings, we have established a rule that requires the Board on remand to engage in a critical examination of the justification for the decision, “reexamine the evidence of record, seek any other evidence the Board feels is necessary, and issue a timely, well-supported decision in this case.” What’s more, the Board must allow a claimant 90 days to submit additional evidence and argument. The question before us is whether these holdings apply to cases adjudicated under the AMA.

Id. at *6.

The Court then discussed the AMA versus Legacy Systems.   The Court explained under the new-AMA system:

when claimants appeal to the Board, they must select one of three dockets. If they select the direct review docket, the record in the claim is limited to the evidence at the time of the AOJ decision. Claimants may change dockets within 1 year of the AOJ decision or within 60 days of when the Board receives the claimant’s NOD, whichever is later. With this overview of Fletcher and Kutscherousky, as well as a better understanding of the AMA and the legacy system, we are closer to explaining how our precedent about a claimant’s rights on remand applies in the AMA.

Id. at *8.  The Court then decided:

Thus, on remand his case will return to the direct review docket he selected. And Congress decided that, in the direct review docket, he will be unable to submit more evidence. The bottom line is that we may not instruct the Board to let Mr. Andrews submit more evidence.

Id. at *10.  The Court also rejected any argument that Court remands should be treated otherwise as the statute did not indicate such.  The Court then stated that

when VA enacted its regulations covering how a claimant may switch dockets, it did so with the knowledge that this Court would be remanding cases. VA explained that “remands require the Board to readjudicate the appeal based upon the same record previously before the Board; accordingly, such appeals would be placed on the same docket that the veteran was on previously.” The bottom line is, we see no reason, and have no authority, to override the text of the statute and the regulation.

Id. at *10.

The Court reasoned:

If we simply ordered that he be allowed to submit evidence on remand while in the direct review docket, we would flout Congress’s instruction that “the evidentiary record before the Board shall be limited to the evidence of record at the time of the decision of the [AOJ] on appeal.” And if we ordered VA to allow Mr. Andrews to pick a different docket on remand, we would have to ignore VA’s regulations that provide specific deadlines for those docket changes—deadlines that have already passed.In effect, we would be again making the Board a body that newly develops and adjudicates evidence rather than the appellate body that the AMA was meant to shore up. Mr. Andrews has not pointed to authority that would enable us to do any of this. True, he has argued that he has a Due Process right to submit additional evidence, but this argument is unconvincing and underdeveloped.

Id. at *10-11.

This is an important case that clarifies that after remand from the Court, the veteran has no right to submit additional evidence.  A small crack remains that a due process argument could sway the Court, however, it will be a hard argument to win.  It was a common practice for good attorneys to win a remand and present a medical opinion to the Board and hope for an early win at the Board.  It appears this has now been eliminated.  Still, this does not undermine the value of a Court appeal as it allows for correction of legal errors and further development by counsel while also preserving the ability to submit new evidence through a supplemental claim if the Board again denies the claim.

Decision by Judge Laurer and joined in by Judges Greenberg and Falvey.

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Thursday, May 27, 2021

Helmick: Accrued Benefits for Someone that Bore the Expense

Helmick v. McDonough, Opinion Number 19-5290, was decided May 25, 2021 and involves whether a someone can receive an accrued benefit following the death of someone entitled to benefits and what the term “bore the expense” in 38 U.S.C. Section 5121 means.

The Court explained:

Congress has provided in 38 U.S.C. § 5121 that certain persons may receive accrued benefits following the death of someone entitled to receive periodic monetary benefits from VA at the time of his or her death. No matter how we approach this appeal, whether the Board erred comes down to the meaning of the phrase "bore the expense" in section 5121(a)(6), a provision describing one category of persons entitled to such accrued benefits. That statutory section provides that "only so much of the accrued benefits may be paid as may be necessary to reimburse the person who bore the expense of last sickness and burial."3 If "bore" means "paid," as the Board assumed, then the Board did not err in denying appellant additional accrued benefits. That is so because it is undisputed that appellant did not pay his mother's medical expenses. Rather, he has always maintained, and as the Board acknowledged, he loaned her $15,000 so that she herself could use the money to pay her medical expenses. She did, but she died before she could repay the loan. But if, on the other hand, "bore" means something broader than "paid," then the Board erred. The Board would have applied the incorrect legal standard to the facts. We hold that, for purposes of section 5121(a)(6) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.1000(a)(5), "bore the expense" means something broader than "paid." That phrase includes, at a minimum, a loan under the circumstances we have here. The Board erred by employing too narrow an understanding of what entitles a person to accrued benefits under the law.

Id. at *1.

Decision by Judge Allen and joined in by Judges Toth and Laurer.

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Davis: Section 3.156(c), Scope of a Claim, and Harmless Error

Davis v. McDonough, Opinion Number 18-4371, was decided May 18, 2021 and involves 3.156(b) and submission of new and material evidence within the appeal period and the Court’s application of harmless error.

The Court explained:

Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b), when new and material evidence is submitted within the appeal period following a VA decision on a claim, the evidence must be considered in connection with that claim.1 Caselaw says that, if VA fails to undertake that consideration, the claim remains pending until it does. Thus, when this rule is implicated, it can require the assignment of effective dates for benefits ultimately granted that are much earlier than would otherwise obtain.

Id. at *1.

However, as applied to this case, the Court determined that even if the Board erred, such error was harmless.  Specifically, the Court wrote:

The Board concluded that VA responded in May 2004 to the evidence submitted, and it is obvious from the record before us that this response constituted the consideration required by § 3.156(b). In other words, any mistake the Board later made in finding the evidence not new or material couldn't have prejudiced the veteran because he received precisely what he contends he was due: consideration of the evidence. Given this, the Court affirms the portion of the Board decision denying an earlier effective date under § 3.156(b).

Id. at *2.

The Court then stated it accepted:

for the sake of argument that Mr. Davis is right and the Board is wrong: that the 2003 statements permissibly clarified that what the veteran submitted in December 2001 was properly construed as a compensation claim for lupus with associated joint and psychiatric problems and not multiple compensation claims based on unrelated disabilities. We further assume, again without deciding, that the Board clearly erred in finding the 2003 statements not new and material.  But Board error does not automatically require setting aside a Board decision. When adjudicating appeals, this Court must "take due account of the rule of prejudicial error."

Id. at *7-8.  The Court then stated that if 3.156(b) applied, the RO had an obligation to consider the 2003 statements as having been filed in connection with the claim which was pending.  But, it then stated a May 2004 RO decision did precisely that.  While discussing the May 2004 RO decision, the Court concluded:

What is clear from the record is the result of its action: a merits decision on compensation for the disabilities identified in the 2003 statements, based on the theories raised in the 2003 statements (lupus arising in service, depression resulting from lupus), and in light of the information and evidence asserted in the 2003 statements.

Id. at *9.  At oral argument, the veteran’s counsel admitted a RO decision had been issued, but argued the only appropriate response was a SSOC.  However, the Court stated it “discern[ed] nothing in § 3.156(b) or the caselaw that would render an admittedly responsive VA consideration of new and material evidence a nullity based simply on the title of the document in which that consideration occurs.”  Id. at *9.

The Court then explained:

To be clear, a determination that VA fulfilled its duty under § 3.156(b) in the May 2004 RO decision says nothing about the correctness of the May 2004 RO decision. If Mr. Davis had appealed that decision, a higher tribunal might have found error in its assessment of the merits or a deficiency in its duty-to-assist obligations. But § 3.156(b) does not provide a remedy for those sorts of VA mistakes. Its purpose is to prevent VA from ignoring new and material evidence received before a claim's appeal period expires; it accomplishes this by keeping that claim pending until VA directly addresses such evidence. See Mitchell, 27 Vet.App. at 439. The May 2004 RO decision directly addressed the 2003 statements. For purposes of this appeal, that is what matters.

Id. at *10.

The Court did remand an issue related to Section 3.156(c).

C.J. Bartley dissented writing that the May 2004 RO decision did not adjudicate the claim for lupus with the understanding that in-service psychiatric symptoms were manifestations of lupus.  Id. at *13.  She thus concluded, “my disagreement is not with the merits of the 2004 RO decision, but with the fact that the RO did not address the evidence in the manner that § 3.156(b) requires.”

This is an interesting case that explores the intersection of 3.156(c), scope of a claim, and harmless error and I expect it to be appealed.

Decision by Judge Toth and joined in by Judge Falvey.  Dissent by C.J. Bartley.

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Tuesday, May 18, 2021

Wolfe: The ER expenses Class Action and Motions Practice Before the Court

Wolfe and Boerschinger v. McDonough, Opinion Number 18-6091, was decided May 13, 2021 and involves motion practice before the Court.

Substantively, the case deals with a class action related to veterans who have sought reimbursement for emergency medical expenses incurred in non-VA facilities.  The Court had certified the class and ordered corrective action in a September 2019 decision.  In December 2019 the Secretary filed a motion to stay the effect of the order, which was denied by the Court.  The decision was appealed to the Federal Circuit where it remains pending.

Now, the Secretary has filed a motion to the Court asking that the Secretary be authorized to suspend retroactive readjudications of the finally denied and unappealed class claims pending the outcome of the Federal Circuit appeal.  The Court ruled it did have jurisdiction to address the issue and has the inherent authority to grant the motion.  It then denied the Secretary’s motion.

As to jurisdiction, the Court noted

Because the Secretary has appealed the September 9, 2019, precedential order, it might appear at first glance that we lack jurisdiction to consider the Secretary's Motion. But we do not. The Secretary asks only to suspend his own action on some claims. He in no way asks us to exercise "control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal" currently pending at the Federal Circuit. Therefore, addressing the Secretary's Motion poses no "danger" that both we and the Federal Circuit "would be simultaneously analyzing the same judgment," which generally is the reason why a filing of a notice of appeal functions as an event of jurisdictional significance.

Id. at *2-3.

The Court then determined it had authority to grant the motion.  It initially determined Rule 8 of the Court rules did not have the Court such authority.  Id. at *6-7. 

As to whether to grant the motion, the Court

looks to the "totality of the circumstances" and pays specific attention to the following factors: (1) The movant's likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal; (2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a suspension of action; (3) the impact of a suspension of action on the non-moving party; and (4) the public interest. The movant bears the burden of demonstrating that a suspension of action is warranted.

Id. at *7.  The Court then reviewed the factors an denied the motion.  Id. at *10-13.

Judge Falvey dissented principally focused on his belief that the underlying case was wrongly decided and his belief that new legal principals, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases already closed.  Id. at *13.

The Secretary’s motion is indicative of the VA foot dragging and unwillingness to concede when they are wrong.  I am glad the Court refused the motion.

Opinion by Judge Allen and joined by Judge Greenberg with a dissent by Judge Falvey.

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Monday, May 17, 2021

Rudisil: Motions Practice Before the Court, the Court's Inherent Authority

Rudisill v. McDonough, Opinion Number 16-4134, was decided May 7, 2021 and involves motion practice before the Court.

Substantively, the case dealt with the interplay of the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) and the Post-9/11 GI Bill Education program.  The Court had previously found veterans with two separate periods of qualifying service, may obtain the full benefits of both the MGIB and Post-9/11 GI Bill, subject to a 36-month cap on utilization of each of the two separate programs and a 48-month cap overall.   The Court also found a veteran with more than one period of separately qualifying service need not relinquish or exhaust entitlement under the MGIB program before receiving education benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill program.  Id. at *2.

The Secretary appealed the decision and requested the Veterans Court stay the effect of the decision until the Federal Circuit had ruled.  The Veterans Court denied the motion.  To this day the Federal Circuit appeal remains pending. 

Finally, the veteran filed a motion asking the Court to direct the BA to provide him his additional Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits pending final resolution of the case.  The Secretary urged denial and argued the Court did not have jurisdiction. 

The Court ruled it did have jurisdiction to address the issue and has the inherent authority to grant the motion.

As to jurisdiction, the Court noted “Because the Secretary has appealed the August 15, 2019, precedential decision, it might appear at first glance that we lack jurisdiction to consider appellant's Motion. But we do not. Appellant asks only for what we have already decided he is entitled to under statute.”  Id. at *3.

The Court elaborated:

Rather, here, we will do no more than comport with our clear precedent that "we retain jurisdiction over the enforcement of our decisions even after we no longer have jurisdiction over the merits of a case because it has been appealed to the Federal Circuit."12 Again, appellant moves only for what we have already decided he is entitled to under statute, pending the Federal Circuit's decision. In other words, he seeks to enforce our prior decision. His Motion does not change the merits questions currently pending the Federal Circuit's review. Therefore, despite the pendency of the Federal Circuit appeal, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to address appellant's Motion because it concerns the enforcement, not the merits, of our prior decision.

Id. at *3-4.

The Court then determined it had authority to grant the motion.  It initially determined Rule 8 of the Court rules did not have the Court such authority.  Id. at *4. 

As to its inherent authority, the Court noted its prior decision in Ribaudo v. Nicholson (Ribaudo I), 20 Vet. App. 552 (2007).  The Court then stated:

To determine whether we should grant appellant's motion for an injunction pending the Federal Circuit's decision, we consider four factors: (1) whether appellant is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether appellant is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) whether the balance of equities tip in his favor; and (4) whether the injunction is in the public interest.

 

Id. at *7.  The Court noted the panel disagreed about the likelihood of success on the merits, but overall agreed the result was in favor of granting the motion.  The Court then ordered the Secretary to pay the veteran.

Chief Judge Bartley concurred and further addressed the likelihood of success on the merits.

This motion decision is indicative of the VA.  Even when a veteran wins and the Court says the effect of the decision is not stayed, the VA will still fight not to give what is due.  I am glad the Court intervened and granted the motion in this case.

Opinion by Judge Allen and joined by Judge Schoelen with a concurrence by C.J. Bartley.

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Wednesday, May 12, 2021

Grimes: What is Encompassed in a Claim

Grimes v. McDonough, Opinion Number 18-1017, was decided April 28, 2021 and involves what all is encompassed in a claim.

Specifically, the Court noted it referred the case to a panel to

address the interplay between VA's obligation under Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 1 (2009), to broadly construe a claim consistent with a lay claimant's reasonable expectations and the general rule of Ephraim v. Brown, 82 F.3d 399 (Fed. Cir. 1996), vacating 5 Vet.App. 549 (1993), and Boggs v. Peake, 520 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) that separately diagnosed conditions with distinct factual bases should ordinarily be treated as separate claims. We hold that these authorities are complementary and that, pursuant to Clemons, a claim for service connection may encompass a related condition that is initially referenced by the claimant but not diagnosed until later in the appeal stream, regardless of whether the claim is initially granted or denied by the RO.

Id. at *2.

The Court explained the veteran applied for loss of hearing, ear aches, sinus pressure, and tinnitus.  A month later he explained he was exposed to jet noise with minimal hearing protection and his "jaw and sinus and hearing [were] never the same" after an in-service wisdom tooth extraction where a military dentist hammered and broke one of his teeth with a chisel.  Id. at *2.  The VA granted hearing loss and tinnitus claims, but denied service connection for aches, sinus pressure.  Id. at *3.  The veteran filed a NOD and he had “sinus pressure and ear pain since service and asserted that he was entitled to service connection for "sinus pressure/ear pressure blockage/and headaches" related to his duties as an aircraft mechanic and the in-service dental surgery.”  Id. at *3.  Later, he explained he had been diagnosed with hyperacusis, abnormal or painful sensitiveness to noise.

Following a Board hearing, the veteran submitted a VA physician's opinion that the veteran's hearing loss was caused by in-service exposure to jet engine noise and that "his tinnitus and hyperacusis are the results or side effects of this damage." R. at 22. The Board then issued the decision currently on appeal, which denied a compensable evaluation for bilateral hearing loss; remanded for further development a claim for a sinus disability characterized by sinus pressure, headaches, earaches, and ear blockage related to in-service dental trauma and/or removal of an ear cyst; and referred for initial development and adjudication a claim for service connection for hyperacusis.

The Court framed the issue as:

whether the veteran's July 2011 claims and ensuing appeals included entitlement to disability compensation for hyperacusis. As relevant here, VA has a duty to "give a sympathetic reading to the veteran's filings by 'determin[ing] all potential claims raised by the evidence, applying all relevant laws and regulations.'" …. This includes "investigat[ing] the reasonably apparent and potential causes of the veteran's condition and theories of service connection that are reasonably raised by the record or raised by a sympathetic reading of the claimant's filing."

Id. at *5.

The Court explained:

Generally, "when a veteran has two diagnoses with separate factual bases, these diagnoses should be treated as two separate claims." Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Boggs, 520 F.3d at 1336; see Ephraim, 82 F.3d at 401-02). However, a claim for service connection may be expanded beyond a veteran's lay description of a disability to include any disability "that may reasonably be encompassed by several factors including: the claimant's description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim." Clemons, 23 Vet.App. at 5. "[T]he claimant's intent in filing a claim is paramount to construing its breadth." Id. To effectuate that intent, "VA shall afford lenity to a veteran's filings that fail to enumerate precisely the disabilities included within the bounds of a claim," which "is best accomplished by looking to the veteran's reasonable expectations in filing the claim and the evidence developed in processing that claim." Murphy, 983 F.3d at 1318. "[T]he fact that the [claimant] may be wrong about the nature of his [or her] condition does not relieve the Secretary of his duty to properly adjudicate the claim."

Id. at *6.  Essentially the veteran argued the Board erred in referring the issue of hyperacusis as opposed to adjudicating it, because his claims were broad enough to encompass it. 

The Court agreed

that the Board erred in treating his request for compensation for hyperacusis as a jurisdictionally separate matter from his appealed bilateral hearing loss and sinus disability claims. When viewed sympathetically, the veteran's filings and actions since July 2011 regarding his hearing problems and "ear aches" related to in-service noise exposure and dental surgery reflect his intent to seek compensation for hyperacusis both as part of his original claims for service connection and the ensuing appeal of those claims.

Id. at *7.

The Court further explained:

When the foregoing filings and actions are sympathetically read in light of his later diagnosis of hyperacusis (i.e., painful, hypersensitive hearing), it is apparent that Mr. Grimes intended for his original claims to encompass hyperacusis, that he timely and consistently disagreed with VA's narrow construction of his claims and treatment of "ear aches" as a separate condition unrelated to his service-connected hearing problems, and that he intended his appeal to the Board to include entitlement to compensation for hyperacusis, either as part of the properly challenged evaluation for bilateral hearing loss or denial of service connection for "aches, sinus disability." See Murphy, 983 F.3d at 1318; Clemons, 23 Vet.App. at 5 (holding that VA "should construe a claim based on the reasonable expectations of the non-expert, self-represented claimant and the evidence developed in processing that claim"). Like the veteran in Clemons, Mr. Grimes "did not file a claim to receive benefits only for a particular diagnosis, but for the affliction his . . . condition . . . causes him"—in this case, hearing problems that included hyperacusis. 23 Vet.App. at 5. Consequently, the Court concludes that the Board clearly erred in finding that Mr. Grimes's initial claims and ensuing appeals did not encompass the issue of entitlement to compensation for hyperacusis.  And because that issue was properly before the Board in the decision currently on appeal, the Court also concludes that the Board erred in referring, rather than adjudicating or remanding, entitlement to compensation for hyperacusis.

Id. at *8-9.

This case demonstrates the attempts by the VA to improperly limit the scope of a claim and willingness to contest that constraint beyond the bounds of what would be expected.  The Court helpfully acknowledges that a veteran is seeking benefits not for a particular diagnosis but the affliction a condition causes.

Opinion by C.J. Bartley and joined by Judges Pietsch and Jaquith.

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