Payne v. Wilkie, Case Number 17-3439, decided August
9, 2019 affirmed and remanded in part a Board decision that discussed several
issues. It remanded as related to
whether a formal claim had to be filed for a SMC(k) and whether a claim for
TDIU was before the Board.
SMC(k) Claim
The Board stated it did not have jurisdiction over
entitlement to SMC(k)(erectile dysfunction) arguing both a requirement to file
a formal claim and that a multi-link causal chain (as found here) prevented
entitlement to SMC(k). The Court disagreed
and explained:
In sum, the Court holds that the plain
text of section 1114(k) does not limit potential entitlement to SMC(k) to
veterans with certain service-connected disabilities or preclude a theory of
entitlement based on a multi-link causal chain between the service-connected
disability and the anatomical loss or loss of use of one or more creative
organs; and that ends the matter. See Procopio v. Wilkie, 913 F.3d 1371, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 2019). Accordingly, the Court
is not persuaded by the Secretary's argument that the appellant's expressly
raised theory of causation—that the upper extremity disabilities
"materially contributed to his development of conditions, such as obesity
and [service-connected] cardiovascular disease, associated with [ED]"—was,
essentially, too tenuous for the issue of entitlement to SMC(k) to be before
the Board as a potentially ancillary benefit to the upper extremity claims on
appeal.
Id. at *10.
The Court also considered whether a post-2014 version of 38
CFR Section 3.155, which required all claims for VA benefits be filed on a standardized
form thus ending the practice of allowing informal claims for benefits, applied
to this set of facts. The Court
concluded:
In sum, because the plain text of §
3.155(d)(2) does not require that a claimant file a formal claim to assert entitlement
to SMC(k) and, as previously discussed, the plain text of section 1114 does not
preclude the appellant's causal theory of entitlement to SMC(k) as a
potentially ancillary benefit to his service-connected upper extremity claims,
the Board erred when it declined to adjudicate the explicitly raised issue of
entitlement to SMC(k).
Id. at *12.
TDIU Effective Date
The VA had granted TDIU with an effective date of March
2005, which was the date of an application for TDIU. The Secretary maintained the issue was not
before the Board because the VA bifurcated the issue in an April 2005 decision
which was not appealed. The Court noted:
“the Court in Rice explained that ‘a request for TDIU . . . is not a separate
claim’ and that, ‘[w]hen entitlement to TDIU is raised during the adjudicatory
process of the underlying disability or during the administrative appeal of the
initial rating assigned for that disability, it is part of the claim for
benefits for the underlying disability.’”
Id. at *14. The Court also turned
to Harper v. Wilkie,30 Vet. App. 356, 359 (2018), which discusses bifurcation. The Court explained:
The Secretary's argument—that the
April 2005 RO decision served to bifurcate the issue of TDIU from the
appellant's claim for benefits for the upper extremity disabilities, thereby removing
it from appellate status and requiring the appellant to file an NOD as to that
decision—is controlled by the Court's recent decision in Harper. In Harper, the Court held that, where the issue
of TDIU was part and parcel of the appellant's appeal for a higher initial
disability rating for his underlying mental condition, the award of TDIU for a
portion of the appeal period "'did not serve to bifurcate the appeal, but
instead served simply to partially grant [Mr. Harper's] request for TDIU.'"
30 Vet.App. at 360-61 (quoting Palmatier v. McDonald, 626 F. App'x 991, 995
(Fed. Cir. 2015)). The Court reasoned that the appellant's "NOD placed the
issue of the appropriate disability evaluation into appellate status and,
therefore, because he was not awarded the highest rating possible, including
TDIU, for the entire appeal period, the issue of entitlement to TDIU [prior to the
effective date of the partial grant] remained on appeal." Id. at 362.
Similarly, in this case, the RO's award of TDIU effective from March 2005
served as a partial grant of benefits and did not bifurcate the issue of TDIU
from the appeal of the initial disability rating for the upper extremity disabilities.
Thus, consistent with Harper, here, the Board had jurisdiction to consider the
issue of TDIU prior to March 2005, which remained in appellate status.
Id. at *14.
The Court noted the VA had tried to argue that Harper concerned
a partial grant of TDIU occuring after the Board adjudicated the underlying claims
whereas here the partial grant of TDIU occurred before the Board adjudicated
the first appeal of the underlying claims.
But, the Court found the distinction did not make a meaningful
difference.
Other Issues
The veteran also argued the Board erred in not ordering a
new examination in light of muscle wasting.
The Court acknowledged that the duty to assist might require a new
examination but that such a duty is triggered when the appellant comes forward
with some evidence that there has been a material change in the disability
since the last examination. Id. at
*16. It noted neither a bald assertion of
change or the mere passage of time is sufficient. Id.
The Court denied the error and seemed to rely substantially on the fact
that the currently assigned rating contemplated muscle atrophy.
The veteran also attempted an argument that problems in this
legs might justify a higher arm rating that was rejected by the Court and the
Court also rejected the reasons and bases argument related to extraschedular
consideration based on a Thun step two analysis (or lack of argument as to
Thun, step two).
Some important takeaways from this case: First, an a multi-link causal connection is
possible if properly argued and supported.
Second, amended Section 3.155 does not require a formal claim for
ancillary benefits. Third, TDIU is an
inferred claim and as such likely to survive a bifurcation argument by the VA.
The decision was by Judge Meredith and joined in by Chief Judge
Davis and Judge Bartley.
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