"It is the duty of the people to care for him who shall have borne the battle, his widow, and orphan."
-Abraham Lincoln

Tuesday, December 20, 2016

Southall-Norman: Painful Motion Applied, Lay Statement Credibility and Inadequate Reasons or Bases

Southall-Norman v. McDonald, Opinion Number 15-1657, decided December 15, 2016 involves a dispute over the proper effective date for a foot disability and service connection for impairment of sphincter control.

After a long fight, the VA finally granted the veteran 50% for flat feet with an effective date the date of the most recent compensation and pension examination.  The veteran sought an initial compensable evaluation for her bilateral foot disability prior to the date of the examination based on 38 CFR 4.59.

Section 4.59 is entitled “Painful motion” precedes the more specific musculoskeletal Diagnostic Codes and states

With any form of arthritis, painful motion is an important factor of disability, the facial expression, wincing, etc., on pressure or manipulation, should be carefully noted and definitely related to affected joints. Muscle spasm will greatly assist the identification. Sciatic neuritis is not uncommonly caused by arthritis of the spine. The intent of the schedule is to recognize painful motion with joint or periarticular pathology as productive of disability. It is the intention to recognize actually painful, unstable, or malaligned joints, due to healed injury, as entitled to at least the minimum compensable rating for the joint. Crepitation either in the soft tissues such as the tendons or ligaments, or crepitation within the joint structures should be noted carefully as points of contact which are diseased. Flexion elicits such manifestations. The joints involved should be tested for pain on both active and passive motion, in weight-bearing and nonweight-bearing and, if possible, with the range of the opposite undamaged joint.

The Secretary argued 4.59 only applies to joint disability where the DC predicates a range of motion measurement.  The Court accepted the veteran’s argument and noted the “Plain language … indicates that the regulation is not limited to the evaluation of musculoskeletal disabilities under DCs predicated on range of motion measurements.”  The Court stated

In other words, Section 4.59 does not, as the Secretary contends, condition the award of a minimum compensable evaluation for a musculoskeletal disability on the presence of a range of motion measurements in that DC; rather, it conditions that award on evidence of an actually painful, unstable, or malaligned joint or periarticular region and the presence of a compensable evaluation in the applicable DC.  Thus, the plain language of Section 4.59 indicates that it is potentially applicable to the evaluation of musculoskeletal disabilities involving joint or periarticular pathology that are painful, whether or not evaluated under a DC predicated on range of motion measurements.

The Court noted that even if Section 4.59 were ambiguous it would rule the same and would not defer to the agency’s proffered interpretation because it does not reflect the agency’s considered view on the matter and pointed to oral argument admissions as well as two nonprecedential decisions were the Secretary conceded the Board provided inadequate reasons or bases for not discussing 4.59 in this context. 

The Court then stated since Section 4.59 is applicable, the Board had to address it in deciding whether the veteran was entitled to an initial compensable evaluation and its failure to do so renders inadequate its reasons or bases and specifically noted evidence as to painful motion.

Regarding sphincter impairment, the issue was fecal leakage.  The veteran argued the Board provided inadequate reasons or bases for its decision that she was not entitled to a separate compensable rating for impairment of sphincter control because it found her board testimony regarding fecal leakage inconsistent with her prior statements.  Specifically, the Board relied on a July 2007 VA examination where she said she had fecal leakage but did not need to wear absorbent pads and her statement in October 2013 that 5-6 years ago she began to experience fecal leakage.  The VA countered the Board made a proper credibility based on numerous inconsistencies in her statements.

The Court agreed with the veteran.  It noted one of the alleged inconsistencies was the October 2013 and July 2007 statements, but then noted that this was not actually an inconstancy because 5-6 years prior to October 2013 is after July 2007.  The Court stated the Board’s reasons or bases for impugning her credibility on that basis are inadequate.  The Court also noted the Board failed to account for potentially favorable medical evidence in the record.  It also noted despite the 2011 examination finding of no impaired sphincter control, “the record is replete with other evidence suggesting such impairment, which the Board improperly discounted.”

The result was a remand on both issues.  This opinion is really a tour de force in explaining that Section 4.59 is not predicated on range of motion measurements and also a text book opinion for eviscerating the Board’s decision and failure to make adequate reasons or bases on multiple issues.  It also, once again, shows the lengths the VA will go to argue a losing interpretation of a regulation—they seem to think the ability to interpret an regulation also includes the ability to ignore its plain language.  It is good to see the Court digging into the VA’s flawed interpretations.


Written by Judge Bartley Davis and joined in by Judges Schoelen and Greenberg.

Cornell: Attorney Fees Earned?

Cornell v. McDonald, Opinion Number 15-3191, decided December 12, 2016 involves a dispute over whether an attorney earned a fee related to a claim.

Cornell represented the veteran on a claim for hearing loss which resulted in a favorable result in 2011.  After the favorable result, the attorney wrote a letter to the veteran closing her file.  Six months later, the veteran, with the assistance of a VSO applied for individual unemployability.  The IU claim was granted with an effective date going back to the initial favorable result in 2011.  The VA withheld the attorney fee from the veteran’s award and paid it over to the attorney.  Five months later, the veteran appeared to have filed a notice of disagreement and the VA attempted to claw back the fee as unearned.

On appeal, the attorney admitted she never presented a claim, argument, or evidence for individual unemployabilty, that she overlooked the possibility of an IU claim, and that she closed her file after the initial favorable decision.  But, the attorney argued that the IU award was premised on her earlier favorable result, used the same effective date, and that the delay in the VA trying to claw back the money (5 months after it was paid to her, which would have been 8-10 months after the veteran found out about the result) all supported finding the award was appropriate.

The Court found she did not contribute to the award and thus did not earn it.

I can’t help but feel the result was correct.  The attorney did not meaningfully contribute to the IU claim.  However, her brief makes clear she only accepted a fee the VA initially determined she was owed.  And, that the challenge to the fee was very delayed (through the negligence of the VA); the result being that a fee she might have used to keep her practice open and help more veterans was taken away from her.  This is a hard case to see any true winners in.  Perhaps the real lesson is the always remember to get in evidence and argument about a claim for individual unemployability.  


Written by Chief Judge Davis and joined in by Judges Kasold and Lance.